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Abstract
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have his-
tories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-
monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible
to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continu-
ation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall (i.e., there is a bound L such that in
any period, the last L signals are sufﬁcient to determine behavior). We show that, in games
with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can
coordinate continuation play.
Keywords: repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination,
bounded recall.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C72, C73, D82.
¤Earlier versions of this material have appeared under the title “Finite State Strategies and Coordination in Re-
peated Games with Private Monitoring.” Some parts of Sections 4 and 5 ﬁrst appeared in “Repeated Games with
Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective.” That paper is subsumed by Mailath and Morris
(2002) and this paper. We thank Andrew Postlewaite for helpful conversations.Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public
Monitoring
by George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
1. Introduction
Intertemporalincentivesoftenallowplayerstoachievepayoffsthatareinconsistentwithmyopic
incentives. For games with public histories, the construction of sequentially rational equilibria
with nontrivial intertemporal incentives is straightforward. Since continuation play in a pub-
lic strategy proﬁle is a function of public histories only, the requirement that continuation play
induced by any public history constitute a Nash equilibrium of the original game is both the nat-
ural notion of sequential rationality and relatively easy to check (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti
(1990)). These perfect public equilibria(or PPE) use public histories to coordinate continuation
play.
While games with private monitoring (where actions and signals are private) have no public
histories to coordinate continuation play, some do have histories that are almost public. We
explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play for such games. It is
always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall
(i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufﬁcient to determine
behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essen-
tially the only behavior that can coordinate continuation play. To make this precise, we must
describe what it means for a game to have “general but almost-public private monitoring” and
“essentially.”
Since the coordination-of-continuation-play interpretation depends on the structure of the
strategy proﬁle, we focus on equilibrium strategy proﬁles, rather than on the equilibrium payoff
set, of private-monitoring games. Very little is known about the general structure of the equilib-
rium payoff set for general private-monitoring games. We return to this issue at the end of the
Introduction.
Fix a game with full support public monitoring (so that every signal arises with strictly
positive probability under every action proﬁle). In the minimal perturbation of the public-
monitoring game towards private monitoring, each player observes a private signal drawn from
the space of public signals, and the other speciﬁcations of the game are unchanged. In this
private-monitoring game, at the end of each period, there is a proﬁle of private signals, and we
say the game has minimally-private almost-public monitoring if the probability of any proﬁle in
which all players observe the same value of the signal is close to the probability of that signal
in the public-monitoring game (there is also positive probability that different players observe
different values of the public signal).
1Any strategy proﬁle of a public-monitoring game naturally induces behavior in minimally-
private almost-public-monitoring games.1 Mailath and Morris (2002) introduced a useful rep-
resentation device for these proﬁles. Recall that all PPE of a public-monitoring game can be
represented in a recursive way by specifying a state space, a transition function mapping public
signals and states into new states, and decision rules for the players, specifying behavior in each
state (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990)). We use the same state space, transition function
and decision rules to summarize behavior in the private-monitoring game. Each player will now
have a private state, and the transition function and decision rules deﬁne a Markov process on
vectors of private states.
This representation is sufﬁcient to describe behavior under the given strategies, but (with
private monitoring) is not sufﬁcient to verify that the strategies are optimal. It is also necessary
to know how each player’s beliefs over the private states of other players evolve. This is at
the heart of the question of whether histories can coordinate continuation play, since, given a
strategy proﬁle, a player’s private state determines that player’s continuation play. A sufﬁcient
condition for a strict equilibrium to remain an equilibrium with private monitoring is that after
every history each player assigns probability uniformly close to one to all other players being
in the same private state (Mailath and Morris (2002, Theorem 4.1)). PPE with bounded recall
satisfy this sufﬁcient condition, since for sufﬁciently close-by games with minimally-private
almost-public monitoring, the probability that all players observed the same last L signals can
be made arbitrarily close to one. However, under other strategy proﬁles, the condition may fail.
The grim trigger PPE in some parameterizations of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma, for exam-
ple, does not induce an equilibrium inany close-by minimally-private almost-public-monitoring
game (Example 2 in Section 3.1).
The restriction to minimally-private almost-public monitoring is substantive, since all play-
ers’ private signals are drawn from a common signal space. In this paper, we allow for the
most general private monitoring consistent with the game being “close-to” a public-monitoring
game. We assume there is a signalling function for each player that assigns to each private
signal either some value of the public signal or a dummy signal (with the interpretation that that
private signal cannot be related to any public signal). Using these signalling functions (one for
each player), there is a natural sense in which the private monitoring distribution can be said
to be close to the public monitoring distribution, even when the sets of private signals differ,
and may have signiﬁcantly larger cardinality than that of the set of public signals. We say such
games have almost-public monitoring. If every private signal is mapped to a public signal, we
say the almost-public-monitoring game is strongly close to the public-monitoring game.
Using the signalling functions, any strategy proﬁle of the public-monitoring game induces
behaviorinstrongly-close-byalmost-public-monitoringgames. Asinminimally-privatealmost-
public-monitoring games, a player’s private state determines that player’s continuation play.
1Since player i’s set of histories in the public-monitoring game and in the minimally-private almost-public-
monitoring game agree, the domains for player i’s strategy in the two games also agree.
2Given a sequence of private signals for a player, that player’s private state is determined by the
induced sequence of public signals that are the result of applying his signalling function. Con-
sequently, it might appear that the richness of the private signals does not alter the situation from
the case of minimally-private almost-public monitoring. However, the richness of the private
signals is important for the formation of that player’s beliefs about the other players’ private
states. It turns out that the requirement that the private-monitoring distribution be close to the
public-monitoring distribution places essentially no restriction on the manner in which private
signals enter into the formation of posterior beliefs. Nonetheless, if the proﬁle has bounded
recall, the richness of the private signals is irrelevant. Indeed, even if the private-monitoring
games are not strongly close to the public-monitoring game, there is still a natural sense in
which every strict PPE with bounded recall induces equilibrium behavior in every close-by
almost-public-monitoring game (Theorem 2).
When a strategy proﬁle of the public-monitoring game does not have bounded recall, re-
alizations of the signal in early periods can have long-run implications for behavior. Subject
to some technical caveats, we call such a proﬁle separating. While the properties of bounded
recall and separation do not exhaust possible behavior, they do appear to cover most behaviors
of interest.2 When the space of private signals is sufﬁciently rich in the values of posterior-odds
ratios (this is what we mean by “general almost public”), and the proﬁle is separating, it is pos-
sible to manipulate a player’s updating over other players’ private states through an appropriate
choice of private history. This suggests that it should be possible to choose a private history
with the property that a player (say, player i) is in one private state and assigns arbitrarily high
probability to all the other players being in a different common private state.
There is a signiﬁcant difﬁculty that needs to be addressed in order to make this argument:
The history needs to have the property that player i is very conﬁdent of the other players’ state
transitions for any given initial state. This, of course, requires the monitoring be almost-public.
At the same time, monitoring must be sufﬁciently imprecise that player i, after an appropriate
initialsegmentofthehistory, assignspositiveprobabilitytotheotherplayersbeinginacommon
state different from i’s private state. This is the source of the difﬁculty: for any T-length history,
there is an e (decreasing in T) such that for private monitoring e-close to the public monitoring,
player i is sufﬁciently conﬁdent of the period T private states of players j 6= i as a function of
their period t < T private states (and the history). However, this e puts an upper bound on the
prior probability that player i can assign in period t to the players j 6= i being in a common state
different from i’s private state. Since the choice of T is decreasing in this prior (i.e., larger T
required for smaller priors), there is a tension in the determination of T and e.
We show, however, that any separating proﬁle implementable using a ﬁnite number of states
has enough structure that we can choose the history so that not only do relevant states cycle,
but that every other state transits under the cycle to a cycling state. The cycle allows us to
2We provide one example of a non-separating proﬁle without bounded recall in Section 5 (Example 6). This
proﬁle is not robust to the introduction of even minimally-private monitoring.
3effectivelychoosetheT aboveindependentlyoftheprior, andgivesusourmainresult(Theorem
4): Separating strict PPE proﬁles of public-monitoring games implementable using a ﬁnite
number of states do not induce Nash equilibria in any strongly-close-by games with rich private
monitoring.
Thus, separating strict PPE of public-monitoring games are not robust to the introduction
of even a minimal amount of private monitoring. Consequently, separating behavior in private-
monitoring games typically cannot coordinate continuation play (Corollary 1). On the other
hand, bounded recall proﬁles are robust to the introduction of private monitoring. The extent
to which bounded recall is a substantive restriction on the set of payoffs is unknown.3 Our
results do suggest, even for public-monitoring games, that bounded recall proﬁles are particu-
larly attractive (since they are robust to the introduction of private monitoring). Moreover, other
apparently simple strategy proﬁles are problematic.
Our focus on equilibrium strategy proﬁles is in contrast with much of the literature in
repeated games with private monitoring.4 For the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with almost-
perfect private monitoring, folk theorems have been proved using both equilibria with a coor-
dination interpretation (for example, Sekiguchi (1997), which we discuss in Example 1, and
Bhaskar and Obara (2002)) and those that are “belief-free” (for example, Piccione (2002), Ely
and V¨ alim¨ aki (2002), and Matsushima (2004)5). Loosely, belief-free equilibria are constructed
so that after relevant histories, players are indifferent between different choices. In games with
ﬁnite signal spaces, this requires a signiﬁcant amount of randomization (randomization is not
required with a continuum of signals, but only because behavior can be puriﬁed using signals).
Not only is the generality of this approach unclear (Ely, H¨ orner, and Olszewski (2005)), these
equilibria do not have a clean coordination interpretation due to the extent of player indiffer-
ences.
Finally, we view our ﬁndings as underlining the importance of communication in private-
monitoring games as a mechanism to facilitate coordination. For some recent work on com-
munication in private-monitoring games, see Compte (1998), Kandori and Matsushima (1998),
Fudenberg and Levine (2004), and McLean, Obara, and Postlewaite (2002).
3Cole and Kocherlakota (forthcming) show that for some parameterizations of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma,
the restriction to strongly symmetric bounded recall PPE results in a dramatic collapse of the set of equilibrium
payoffs.
4See Kandori (2002) for a brief survey of this literature, as well as the accompanying symposium issue of the
Journal of Economic Theory on “Repeated Games with Private Monitoring.”
5Matsushima (2004) covers some two player games with private monitoring that need not be almost perfect, with
signals that are either conditionally independent or have a particular correlation structure. His analysis does not
cover almost-public-monitoring games.
42. Games with Imperfect Monitoring
2.1. Private-Monitoring Games
The inﬁnitely-repeated game with private monitoring is the inﬁnite repetition of a stage game
in which at the end of the period, each player learns only the realized value of a private signal.
There are n players, with a ﬁnite stage-game action set for player i 2 N ´ f1::::;ng denoted Ai.
At the end of each period, each player i observes a private signal, denoted wi drawn from a ﬁnite
set Wi. The signal vector w ´ (w1;:::;wn) 2W ´W1£¢¢¢£Wn occurs with probability p(wja)
when the action proﬁle a 2 A ´ ÕiAi is chosen. Player i does not receive any information other
than wi about the behavior of the other players. All players use the same discount factor, d.
Since wi is the only signal a player observes about opponents’ play, we assume (as usual)
that player i’s payoff after the realization (w;a) is given by u¤
i (wi;ai). Stage game payoffs
are then given by ui(a) ´ åw u¤
i (wi;ai)p(wja). It will be convenient to index games by the
monitoring technology (W;p), ﬁxing the set of players and action sets.




is the set of private histories for player i.
Deﬁnition 1 A pure strategy is action-free if, for all ht
i;ˆ ht
i 2Hi satisfying wt
i = ˆ wt
i for all t ·t,
si(ht
i) = si(ˆ ht
i):
Since action-free strategies play a central role in our analysis, it is useful to note the follow-
ing immediate result, which does not require full-support monitoring (its proof is omitted):
Lemma 1 Every pure strategy in a private-monitoring game is realization equivalent to an
action-free strategy. Every mixed strategy is realization equivalent to a mixture over action-free
strategies.
Remark 1 Behavior strategies realization equivalent to a mixed strategy will typically not be
action-free. For example, consider the once repeated prisoners’ dilemma, with action spaces
Ai =fei;nig,6 Wi =fgi;big, andthemixedstrategyassigningequalprobabilitytothetwoaction-
free strategies ¯ s1 and ˜ s1, where
¯ s1(?) = e1; ¯ s1(g1) = e1; ¯ s1(b1) = n1;
and
˜ s1(?) = n1; ˜ s1(g1) = n1; ˜ s1(b1) = n1:




Figure 1: The prisoners’ dilemma.
A behavior strategy realization equivalent to this mixed strategy must specify in the second pe-
riod behavior that depends nontrivially on player 1’s ﬁrst period action. (A similar observation
applies to public-monitoring games: every pure strategy is realization equivalent to a public
strategy, every mixed strategy is realization equivalent to a mixture over public strategies, and
yet all behavior strategies that are realization equivalent to a mixed strategy may not be public.)
Every pure action-free strategy can be represented by a set of states Wi, an initial state w1
i ,
a decision rule di :Wi ! Ai specifying an action choice for each state, and a transition function
si :Wi£Wi !Wi. In the ﬁrst period, player i chooses action a1
i = di(w1
i ). At the end of the ﬁrst
period, the vector of actions, a1, then generates a vector of private signals w1 according to the
distribution p(¢ ja1), and player i observes the signal w1








i ), and so on. Any action-free strategy requires at
most the countable setWi = [¥
t=1Wt¡1
i .
Any collection of pure action-free strategies can be represented by a set of states Wi, a
decision rule di, and a transition function si (the initial state indexes the pure strategies). One
classofmixedstrategiesisdescribedby(Wi;mi;di;si), where mi isaprobabilitydistributionover
the initial state w1
i , and Wi is countable. Not all mixed strategies can be described in this way,
since the set of all pure strategies is uncountable (which would requireWi to be uncountable).
Remark 2 A consequence of Remark 1 is that action-free strategy proﬁles, and proﬁles of
mixtures over action-free strategies, are often not sequentially rational. However, when the
monitoring has full support, every Nash equilibrium has a realization-equivalent sequentially
rational strategy proﬁle (see Sekiguchi (1997, Proposition 3) and Kandori and Matsushima
(1998, p. 648)). Consequently, we focus on Nash equilibria of games with private monitoring.
Example 1 We will often use the repeated prisoners’ dilemma under various monitoring as-
sumptions. The ex ante stage game is given by the normal form in Figure 1.7 Much of the
literature has studied almost-perfect conditionally-independent private monitoring: player i’s




. Players 1 and 2’s
7Here (and in other examples) we follow the literature in assuming the ex ante payoff matrix is independent of
the monitoring distribution. This simpliﬁes the discussion and is without loss of generality: Ex ante payoffs are
close when the monitoring distributions are close (Lemma 4) and all relevant incentive constraints are strict.
6signal are, conditional on the action proﬁle, independently distributed, with




1¡e; if ˆ ai = aj;
e; if ˆ ai 6= aj;
where e > 0 is a small constant. As will be clear, we focus on a different class of private
monitoring distributions.
In an important article, Sekiguchi (1997) constructed an efﬁcient equilibrium for the almost-
perfectconditionally-independent case (as wellas for correlated butalmost-perfect monitoring).
Let Wi = fwe;wng, si(wn; ˆ ai) = wn for all ˆ ai, si(we; ˆ ei) = we, and si(we; ˆ ni) = wn. The pure
strategy of grim trigger (begin playing ei, and continue to play ei as long as ˆ ei is observed,
switch to ni after ˆ ni and always play ni thereafter) is induced by the initial state w1
i = we. The
pure strategy of always play ni is induced by the initial state w1
i = wn. The critical insight in
Sekiguchi(1997)isthatwhilegrimtriggerisnotaNashequilibriumofthisgame, thesymmetric
mixed strategy proﬁle where each player independently randomizes over initial states we and
wn is an equilibrium (as long as d is not too close to 1). Sekiguchi (1997) then constructs an
equilibrium for larger d by treating the game as M distinct games, with the kth game played in
periods k+tM, for t 2 À. The mixed equilibrium for M = 3 is constructed from the machine
in Figure 2. The state wene for example corresponds to grim trigger in “games” 1 and 3, and
always ni in game 2.
2.2. Public-Monitoring Games
We turn now to the benchmark public-monitoring game for our games with private monitoring.
The ﬁnite action set for player i 2 N is again Ai. The public signal is denoted y and is drawn
from a ﬁnite setY. The probability that the signal y occurs when the action proﬁle a2A´ÕiAi
is chosen is denoted r(yja). We refer to (Y;r) as the public-monitoring distribution. Player i’s
payoff after the realization (y;a) is given by ˜ u¤
i (y;ai). Stage game payoffs are then given by
˜ ui(a) ´ åy ˜ u¤
i (y;ai)r(yja). The inﬁnitely repeated game with public monitoring is the inﬁnite
repetition of this stage game in which at the end of the period each player learns only the
realized value of the signal y. Players do not receive any other information about the behavior
of the other players. All players use the same discount factor, d.
A strategy for player i is public if, in every period t, it only depends on the public history
ht 2Yt¡1, and not on i’s private history.8 Henceforth, by the term public proﬁle, we will always
mean a strategy proﬁle for the public-monitoring game that is itself public. A perfect public
equilibrium (PPE) is a proﬁle of public strategies that, after observing any public history ht,
8Note that strategies of public-monitoring games are public if and only if they are action-free when we view the













i n ˆ i n ˆ i n ˆ
i n ˆ
Figure 2: The automaton described the pure strategies in Sekiguchi (1997) for M = 3. The
decision rules are di(wabc) = ai. Unlabeled arrows are unconditional transitions.
speciﬁes a Nash equilibrium for the repeated game. Under imperfect full-support public mon-
itoring, every public history arises with positive probability, and so every Nash equilibrium in
public strategies is a PPE.
Any pure public strategy proﬁle can be described as an automaton as follows: There is a set
of states, W, an initial state, w1 2W, a transition function s :W £Y !W, and a collection of





of actions, a1, then generates a signal y1 according to the distribution r
¡
¢ja1¢
. In the second




, where w2 = s
¡
w1;y1¢
, and so on. Since we
can take W to be the set of all histories of the public signal, [k¸0Yk, W is at most countably
inﬁnite. A public proﬁle is ﬁnite if W is a ﬁnite set. Note that, given a pure strategy proﬁle
(and the associated automaton), continuation play after any history is determined by the public
state reached by that history. In games with private monitoring, by contrast, given an action-free
strategy proﬁle (and the associated automaton), a sufﬁcient statistic for continuation play after
any history is the vector of current private states, one for each player.
Denote the vector of average discounted expected values of following the public proﬁle
(W;w;s;d) (i.e., the initial state is w) by f(w). Deﬁne a function g : A£W !W by g(a;w) ´
(1¡d)u(a)+d åyf (s (w;y))r(yja). We have (from Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990)),
that if the proﬁle is an equilibrium, then, for all w 2W, the action proﬁle (d1(w);:::;dN(w)) ´
d(w) is a pure strategy equilibrium of the static game with strategy spaces Ai and payoffs





an equilibrium of the static game with payoffs g(¢;w) for all w 2 W, then the induced pure
8strategy proﬁle in the inﬁnitely repeated game with public monitoring is an equilibrium.9 A
PPE (W;w1;s;d) is strict if, for all w 2W, d(w) is a strict Nash equilibrium of the static game
g(¢ :;w).10
A maintained assumption throughout our analysis is that public monitoring has full support.
Assumption 1 r(yja) > 0 for all y 2Y and all a 2 A.
Deﬁnition 2 An automaton (W;w1;s;d) is minimal if for every state ˆ w 2 W, there exists
a sequence of signals ˆ y1;:::; ˆ y` such that ˆ w = s(ˆ y1;:::; ˆ y`;w1)), where s(ˆ y1;:::; ˆ y`;w1) ´
s(ˆ y`;s(:::;s(ˆ y1;w1))), and for every pair of states w; ˆ w2W, there exists a sequence of signals
y1;:::;yL such that for some i, di(s(y1;:::;yL;w)) 6= di(s(y1;:::;yL; ˆ w)).
The restriction to minimal automata is without loss of generality: every proﬁle has a min-
imal representing automaton. Moreover, this automaton is essentially unique.11 Accordingly,
we treat a public strategy proﬁle and its minimal representing automaton interchangeably.
3. Almost-Public Monitoring
3.1. Minimally-private almost-public monitoring
Games with public monitoring (Y;r) are nested within games with private monitoring, since
public monitoring simply means that all players always observe the same signal, i.e., Wi =
Wj =Y, and p(y;:::;yja) = r(yja) for all a. Mailath and Morris (2002) discussed the case of
minimally-private monitoring, in the sense that there is a public monitoring distribution (Y;r)
with Wi =Y and p close to r:
Deﬁnition 3 A private-monitoring game (u¤;(Yn;p)) is e-close to a public-monitoring game
(˜ u¤;(Y;r)), if j˜ u¤
i (y;ai)¡u¤
i (y;ai)j < e and jp((y;:::;y)ja)¡r(yja)j < e for all i 2 N, y 2Y
and all a 2 A. We also say that such a private-monitoring game has minimally-private almost-
public monitoring.
9We have introduced a distinction between W and the set of continuation payoffs for convenience. Any pure
strategy equilibrium payoff can be supported by an equilibrium where W ½ ÂI and f (w) = w (again, see Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990)).
10Equivalently, a PPE is strict if each player strictly prefers his equilibrium strategy to every other public strategy.
For a large class of public-monitoring games, strictness is without loss of generality, in that a folk theorem holds for
strict PPE (Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994, Theorem 6.4 and remark)).
11Suppose (W;w1;s;d) and ( ˜ W; ˜ w1; ˜ s; ˜ d) are two minimal automata representing the same public strategy proﬁle.
Deﬁne a mapping j : W ! ˜ W as follows: Set j(w1) = ˜ w1. For ˆ w 2 Wnfw1g, let ˆ y1;:::; ˆ y` be a public history
reaching ˆ w (i.e., ˆ w = s(ˆ y1;:::; ˆ y`;w1)), and set j( ˆ w) = ˜ s(ˆ y1;:::; ˆ y`; ˜ w1)). Since both automata are minimal and
represent the same proﬁle, j does not depend on the choice of public history reaching ˆ w. It is straightforward to
verify that j is one-to-one and onto. Moreover, ˜ s(y; ˜ w) = j(s(y;j¡1( ˜ w)), and ˜ d( ˜ w) = d(j(w)).














In other words, the ex ante stage payoffs of any minimally-private almost-public-monitoring
game are close to the ex ante stage payoffs of the benchmark public-monitoring game.
An important implication of the assumption that the public monitoring has full support is
that when a player observes a private signal y, (for e small) that player assigns high probability
to all other players also observing the same signal, irrespective of the actions taken. Since the
proof is immediate, it is omitted.
Lemma 2 Fix a full support public monitoring distribution r and h > 0. There exists e > 0
such that if p is e-close to r, then for all a 2 A and y 2Y,
pi(y1ja;y) > 1¡h:
A public strategy proﬁle (W;w1;s;d) in the public-monitoring game induces a strategy pro-





i ) = di(s(w1;y1
i )) ´ di(w2











i ) 2 (A£Y)t¡1, st
i(ht
i) = di(wt
i). This private strategy is, of
course, action-free.
If W is ﬁnite, each player can be viewed as following a ﬁnite state automaton. Hopefully




i). We describe wt
i as player i’s private state in period t. It is important
to note that while all players are in the same private state in the ﬁrst period, since the signals
are private, after the ﬁrst period, different players may be in different private states. The private
proﬁle is the translation to the private-monitoring game of the public proﬁle (of the public-
monitoring game).
If player i believes that the other players are following a strategy that was induced by a
public proﬁle, then a sufﬁcient statistic of ht
i for the purposes of evaluating continuation strate-




i 2 D(WN¡1). In principle, W may be quite large. For example, if the public strategy
proﬁle is nonstationary, it may be necessary to takeW to be the set of all histories of the public
signal, [k¸0Yk. On the other hand, the strategy proﬁles typically studied can be described with
a signiﬁcantly more parsimonious collection of states, often ﬁnite. When W is ﬁnite, the need
to only keep track of each player’s private state and that player’s beliefs over the other players’
private states is a considerable simpliﬁcation, as the following result (Mailath and Morris (2002,
Theorem 4.2)) demonstrates.
10Theorem 1 Suppose the public proﬁle (W;w1;s;d) is a strict equilibrium of the full-support














i), and if p is e-close to r, then the private proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium
of the game with private monitoring for the same d and the expected payoff in that equilibrium
is within k of the public equilibrium payoff.
Example 2 We return to the repeated prisoners’ dilemma, with ex ante stage game given by
Figure 1 (recall footnote 7). In the benchmark public-monitoring game, the set of public signals





p; if a1a2 = e1e2
q; if a1a2 = e1n2 or n1e2;
r; if a1a2 = n1n2:
The grim trigger strategy proﬁle for the public-monitoring game is described by the automaton
W = fwe;wng, initial state we, decision rules di(wa) = ai, and transition rule
s(w;y) =
½
we; if y = ¯ y and w = we;
wn; otherwise.
Grim trigger is a strict PPE if d > (3p¡2q)¡1 > 0 (a condition we maintain throughout this
example). We turn now to minimally-private-monitoring games that are e-close to this public-
monitoring game. It turns out that, for e small, grim trigger induces a Nash equilibrium in
such games if q < r, but not if q > r. Consider ﬁrst the case q > r and the private history
(e1y
1;n1¯ y1;n1¯ y1;:::;n1¯ y1). We now argue that, after a sufﬁciently long such history, the grim
trigger speciﬁcation of n1 is not optimal. Intuitively, while player 1 has transited to the private
state wn
1, player 1 always puts strictly positive (but perhaps small) probability on his opponent
being in private state we
2. Since q > r (and e is small), the private signal ¯ y1 after playing n1
is an indication that player 2 had played e2 (rather than n2), and so player 1’s posterior that
player 2 is still in we
2 increases. Eventually, player 1 is sufﬁciently conﬁdent of player 2 still
being in we
2 that he ﬁnds n1 suboptimal. On the other hand, when q · r, such a history is not
problematic because it reinforces 1’s belief that 2 is also in wn





1) and (e1¯ y1;e1¯ y1;e1¯ y1;:::;e1¯ y1). Under the ﬁrst history,
while the signal y
1 is now a signal that 2 had chosen e2 in the previous period, for e small, 1
is conﬁdent that 2 also observed y
2 and so will transit to wn
2. For the ﬁnal history, the signal ¯ y1
continually reassures 1 that 2 is still playing e2, and so e1 remains optimal. (See Mailath and
Morris (2002, Section 3.3) for the calculations underlying this discussion.)
Example 3 As the players become patient, the payoffs from grim trigger converge to (0;0). A









Figure 3: Forgiving grim trigger where any two realizations of y lead to wn.
signiﬁcant payoffs for patient players by being forgiving.12 Such a proﬁle provides a different
example of how a strict PPE can fail to induce a Nash equilibrium in close-by minimally-
private-monitoringgames. Thesimplestforgivingproﬁlerequirestworealizationsofytoswitch
to n1n2. The automaton for this proﬁle has a set of states W = fwe; ˆ we;wng, initial state we,





we; if y = ¯ y and w = we;
ˆ we; if y = y and w = we or y = ¯ y and w = ˆ we;
wn; otherwise.
The proﬁle is illustrated in Figure 3. This PPE never induces a Nash equilibrium in close-
by minimally-private-monitoring games: consider a private history in which player 1 plays e1
and observes ¯ y1 for T periods, and then observes y
1. Under the forgiving proﬁle, player 1 is
supposed to switch to the private state ˆ we
1 and continue to play e1 (until another y
1 is observed).
But, for large T, it is more likely that player 2 has observed y
2 in exactly one of the ﬁrst T
periods than having observed ¯ y2 in every period.13 Consequently, for large T, player 1 will not
ﬁnd e1 optimal. Clearly, the same analysis applies to forgiving grim triggers that require more
realizations of y to switch to wn.
Another class of forgiving grim trigger proﬁles requires successive realizations of y to
switchtown. Inthethreestateversion, theautomatonisidenticaltothataboveexcepts( ˆ we; ¯ y)=
we (see Figure 4). The analysis of this proﬁle is similar to that of Example 2. The proﬁle does
not induce a Nash equilibrium in close-by minimally-private-monitoring games if q > r for
similar reasons. There are now two possibilities for the case q · r, since isolated observations
of y
1 do not lead to wn
2. For the histories considered in Example 2, the same argument applies
once we note that, conditional on players being in one of we or ˆ we, a player assigns very high
probability to the other player being in the same state, since this is determined by the last signal.
12This is the class of proﬁles studied by Compte (2002) for the conditionally-independent private-monitoring
prisoners’ dilemma.
13This type of drift of beliefs is a general phenomenon when players choose the same action in adjacent states









Figure 4: Forgiving grim trigger where two successive realizations of y lead to wn.
The remaining histories are those with isolated observations of y
1. The critical history (since it
contains the largest fraction of y
1’s consistent with e1) is (e1¯ y1;e1y
1;e1¯ y1;e1y
1;:::;e1¯ y1), that is,
alternating y
1 and ¯ y1. If p(1¡ p) ¸ q(1¡q), then such a history (weakly) indicates that player
2 is still playing e2, while the reverse strict inequality indicates that player 2 is playing n2.
Summarizing, the proﬁle induces a Nash equilibrium in close-by minimally-private-monitoring
games if and only if q · r and p(1¡ p) ¸ q(1¡q).
3.2. General almost-public monitoring
We now turn to the most general private monitoring structure that nonetheless preserves the
essential characteristics of both Deﬁnition 3 and Lemma 2.14
Deﬁnition 4 The private monitoring distribution (W;p) is e-close under f to the public mon-
itoring distribution (Y;r), where f = (f1;:::; fn) is a vector of signaling functions fi : Wi !
Y [f?g, if
1. for each a 2 A and y 2Y,
¯ ¯ ¯




14While there is a connection to informational smallness (see, for example, McLean and Postlewaite (2004)),
these are distinct notions. For concreteness, suppose wi is a noisy signal of y. Then, (W;p) is e-close to (Y;r) if
and only if the private signal is a sufﬁciently accurate signal of y. A player is informationally small if the posterior
on y, conditional on the other players’ private signals, on average does not vary too much with that player’s private
signal. Even if each player’s private signal is very accurate, the posterior can vary dramatically in a player’s signal
if that player’s signal is sufﬁciently accurate relative to the other players. Moreover, if there are many players, even
when signals are very noisy, each player will be informationally small.
132. for all y 2Y, wi 2 f ¡1
i (y), and all a 2 A,
p
¡©





The private monitoring distribution (W;p) is strongly e-close under f to the public mon-
itoring distribution (Y;r) if it is e-close under f, and in addition, all the signaling functions
map intoY.
A private monitoring distribution (W;p) is (strongly) e-close to the public monitoring dis-
tribution (Y;r) if there exists a vector of signaling functions f such that (W;p) is (strongly)
e-close under f to (Y;r).
If the private monitoring is e-close under f, but not strongly e-close under f, then some
private signals are not associated with any public signal: there is a signal wi satisfying fi(wi) =
?. Such an “uninterpretable” signal may contain no information about the signals observed by
the other players.
Note that the second condition implies that every player has at least one private signal
mapped to each public signal. Moreover, for the case Wi = Y, the ﬁrst condition implies the
second (Lemma 2).
The condition of e-closeness in Deﬁnition 4 can be restated as follows. Recall from Mon-
derer and Samet (1989) that an event is p-evident if, whenever it is true, everyone assigns
probability at least p to it being true. The following Lemma is a straightforward application of
the deﬁnitions, and so we omit the proof.
Lemma 3 Suppose fi : Wi !Y [f?g, i = 1;:::;n, is a collection of signaling functions. The
private monitoring distribution (W;p) is e-close under f to the public monitoring distribution
(Y;r) if and only if for each public signal y, the set of private signal proﬁles fw : fi(wi) = y for
all ig is (1¡e)-evident (conditional on any action proﬁle) and has probability within e of the
probability of y (conditional on that action proﬁle).




keeping player 2 signals unchanged, W2 =fy
2; ¯ y2g. The probability distribution of the signals is
given in Figure 5. This private-monitoring distribution is
p
e-close to the public-monitoring dis-
tributionofExample2underthesignalingfunctions fi(y
i)=yand f2(¯ y2)= f1(¯ y0
1)= f1(¯ y00
1)= ¯ y,
as long as e is sufﬁciently small, relative to minfa0;a ¡a0g.
Deﬁnition 5 Aprivate-monitoringgame(u¤;(W;p))ise-close(under f)tothepublic-monitoring
game (˜ u¤;(Y;r)), if (W;p) is e-close under f to (Y;r) and
j˜ u¤
i (fi(wi);ai)¡u¤
i (wi;ai)j < e
for all i 2 N, ai 2 Ai, and wi 2 f¡1









1 e (a ¡a0)(1¡3e)
Figure 5: The probability distribution of the private signals for Example 4. The distribution is
given as a function of the action proﬁle a1a2, where a = p if a1a2 = e1e2, q if a1a2 = e1n2 or
n1e2, and r if a1a2 = n1n2 (analogously, a0 is given by p0, q0, or r0 as a function of a1a2). All
probabilities are strictly positive.
As above, the ex ante stage payoffs of any almost-public-monitoring game are close to the
ex ante stage payoffs of the benchmark public-monitoring game (the proof is in the Appendix).
Lemma 4 For all h > 0, there is e > 0 such that if (u¤;(W;p)) is e-close to (˜ u¤;(Y;r)), then
¯ ¯














of a full-support public-monitoring game (˜ u¤;(Y;r)), and,
under f, a strongly e-close private-monitoring game (u¤;(W;p)). The public proﬁle induces a
private proﬁle in the private-monitoring game in a natural way: Player i’s strategy is described
by the automaton (W;w1;si;di), where si(w;wi) = s(w; fi(wi)) for all wi 2 Wi and w 2 W.
The set of states, initial state, and decision function are from the public proﬁle. The transition
function si is well-deﬁned, because the signaling functions all map intoY, rather thanY [f?g.
Asforgameswithminimally-privatealmost-publicmonitoring, ifplayeribelievesthattheother
players are following a strategy induced by a public proﬁle, a sufﬁcient statistic of ht
i for the
purposes of evaluating continuation strategies is player i’s private state and i’s beliefs over the
other players’ private states, i.e., (wt
i;bt




. Finally, we can recursively
calculate the private states of player i as w2
i = s(w1; fi(w1





and so on. Thus, for any private history ht
i, we can write wt
i = si(ht
i).
Example 5 In Example 2, we argued that if q < r, grim trigger induces Nash equilibrium be-
havior in close-by minimally-private-monitoring games. We now argue that under the private
monitoring distribution of Example 4, even if q < r, grim trigger will not induce a Nash equi-
librium behavior in some close-by games. In particular, suppose 0 < r0 < q0 < q < r. Under
this parameter restriction, the signal ¯ y00
1 after n1 is indeed a signal that player 2 had also played
n2. However, the signal ¯ y0
1 after n1 is a signal that player 2 had played e2 and so a sufﬁciently




1) will lead to a posterior for player 1
at which n1 is not optimal.
154. PPE with bounded recall
As we saw in Example 5, arbitrary public equilibria need not induce equilibria of almost-public-
monitoring games, because the public state in period t is determined, in principle, by the entire
history ht. For proﬁles that have bounded recall, the entire history is not needed, and equilibria
in bounded recall strategies will induce equilibria in almost-public-monitoring games.15
Deﬁnition 6 A public proﬁle s has bounded recall if there exists L such that for all ht =





LetWt be the set of states reachable in periodt,Wt ´fw2W :w=s(w1;y1;y2;:::;yt¡1) for
some (y1;y2;:::;yt¡1), where w1 is the initial stateg. The following characterization of bounded
recall (proved in the Appendix) is useful.
Lemma 5 The public proﬁle induced by the minimal automaton (W;w1;s;d) has bounded re-
call if and only if there exists L such that, for all t and w;w0 2Wt and for all h 2Y¥,
s(w;hL) = s(w0;hL):




. Fix a private monitoring
technology (W;p) e-close under f to (Y;r). Following Monderer and Samet (1989), we ﬁrst




i 2 f ¡1
i (?); some t satisfying
t ¡L · t · t ¡1g. This is the set of private histories for which in any of the last L periods, a
private signal wt
i satisfying fi(wt
i ) = ? is observed. We ﬁx arbitrarily player i’s action after
any private history ht
i 2 Hu
i . For any private history that is not uninterpretable, each of the last
L observations of the private signal can be associated with a public signal by the function fi.
Denote by wi(ht






i = 2 Hu
i . We are then left with a game in which in period t ¸ 2 player i only chooses
an action after a signal wt¡1
i yields a private history not in Hu
i . We claim that for e sufﬁciently
15Denote a dummy signal by ¤. Mailath and Morris (2002) used the term bounded memory for public pro-
ﬁles with the property that there is an integer L such that a representing automaton is give by W = (Y [f¤g)L,
s(y;(yL;:::;y2;y1)) = (y;yL;:::;y2) for all y 2Y, and w1 = (¤;:::;¤). Our earlier notion implicitly imposes a time
homogeneity condition, since the caveat in Lemma 5 that the two states should be reachable in the same period is
missing. The strategy proﬁle in which play alternates between the same two action proﬁles in odd and even periods
has bounded recall, but not bounded memory.







i ); if t = 1;
di(wi(ht
i)); if t > 1 and ht
i = 2 Hu
i :
But this follows from arguments almost identical to that in the proofs of Mailath and Morris
(2002, Theorems 4.2 and 4.3): since a player’s behavior depends only on the last L signals,
for small e, after observing a history ht
i = 2 Hu
i , player i assigns a high probability to player j
observing a signal that leads to the same private state. The crucial point is that for e small,
the speciﬁcation of behavior after signals wi satisfying fi(wi) = ? is irrelevant for behavior at
signalswi satisfying fi(wi)2Y. Itremainstospecifyoptimalbehavioraftersignalswi satisfying
fi(wi) = ?. So, consider a new constrained game where player i is required to follow ˆ si where
possible. This constrained game has an equilibrium, and so by construction, we thus have an
equilibrium of the unconstrained game. We have thus proved:
Theorem 2 Fix a full-support public-monitoring game (˜ u¤;(Y;r)) and a strict public perfect
equilibrium, ˜ s, with bounded recall L. There exists e > 0 such that for all private-monitoring
games (u¤;(W;p)) e-close under f to (˜ u¤;(Y;r)),
1. if fi(Wi) =Y for all i, the induced private proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium; and
2. if fi(Wi) 6=Y for some i, there is a Nash equilibrium of the private-monitoring game, s,
such that, for all ht = (y1;:::;yt¡1) and ht
j = (w1
j;:::;wt¡1
j ), if t > L and yt = fj(wt
j) for
t =t ¡L;:::;t ¡1, then
sj(ht
j) = ˜ sj(ht)
for all j. Moreover, for all k > 0, e can be chosen sufﬁciently small that the expected
payoff to each player under s is within k of their public equilibrium payoff.
We could similarly extend our results on patiently-strict, connected, ﬁnite public proﬁles
(Mailath and Morris (2002, Theorem 5.1)) and on the almost-public almost-perfect folk theo-
rem (Mailath and Morris (2002, Theorem 6.1)) to this more general notion of nearby private-
monitoring distributions.
5. Failure of Coordination
Example 5 illustrates that updating in almost-public-monitoring games can be very different
than would be expected from the underlying public-monitoring game. In this section, we build
on that example to show that when the set of signals is sufﬁciently rich (in a sense to be deﬁned),
many proﬁles fail to induce equilibrium behavior in almost-public-monitoring games.
17Our negative results are based on the following converse to Theorem 1 (the proof is in the
Appendix). Since the theorem is negative, the assumption of strong e-closeness enhances the
usefulness of the result.16




is a strict equilibrium of the full-support
public-monitoring game (˜ u¤;(Y;r)) for some d and jWj<¥. There exists h >0 and e >0 such
that for any game with private monitoring (u¤;(W;p)) strongly e-close to (˜ u¤;(Y;r)), if there
exists a player i, a private history for that player ht
i, and a state w such that di(w) 6= di(si(ht
i))
and bi(w1jht
i) > 1¡h, then the induced private proﬁle is not a Nash equilibrium of the game
with private monitoring for the same d.
We implicitly used this result in our discussions of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma. For
example, in Example 5, we argued that there was a private history for player 1 that leaves him
in the private state wn
1, but his posterior after that history assigns probability close to 1 that
player 2’s private state is we
2.
Our approach is to ask when it is possible to so “manipulate” a player’s beliefs through
selection of private history that the hypotheses of Theorem 3 are satisﬁed. In particular, we are
interested in the weakest independent conditions on the private-monitoring distributions and on
the strategy proﬁles that would allow such manipulation.
Fix a PPE of the public-monitoring game and a close-by almost-public-monitoring game.
The logic of Example 5 runs as follows: Consider a player i in a private state ˆ w who assigns
strictly positive (albeit small) probability to all the other players being in some other common
private state ¯ w 6= ˆ w (full-support private monitoring ensures that such an occurrence arises with
positive probability). Let ˜ a = (di( ˆ w);d¡i( ¯ w)) be the action proﬁle that results when i is in state
ˆ w and all the other players are in state ¯ w. Suppose that if any other player is in a different
private state w 6= ¯ w, then the resulting action proﬁle differs from ˜ a. Suppose, moreover, there
is a signal y such that ˆ w = s( ˆ w;y) and ¯ w = s( ¯ w;y), that is, any player in the state ˆ w or ¯ w
observing a private signal consistent with y stays in that private state (and so the proﬁle cannot
have bounded recall, see Lemma 5). Suppose ﬁnally there is a private signal wi for player i
consistent with y that is more likely to have come from ˜ a than any other action proﬁle, i.e.,
wi 2 f ¡1
i (y) and (where pi(wija) is the probability that player i observes the signal wi under a)
pi(wij˜ a) > pi(wij(di( ˆ w);a0
¡i)) 8a0
¡i 6= d¡i( ¯ w): (1)
16While we have stated this theorem, and Theorem 4 below, for pure strategies, they also hold for some mixed
strategyproﬁles. RecallfromSection 2.1thatgivenanautomaton (W;di;si)describingacollectionofpurestrategies
for player i (taking any state w 2W as the initial state gives a pure strategy), a probability distribution over W gives
a mixed strategy. Consider now a mixed strategy PPE of the game with public-monitoring. Clearly, such a proﬁle
cannot be strict. However, there may exist a period T, such that all the incentive constraints after period T are strict
(the equilibria in Sekiguchi (1997) are important examples). In that case, Theorem 3 holds if the hypotheses are
satisﬁed for t ¸ T.
18Then, after observing the private signal wi, player i’s posterior probability that all the other
playersarein ¯ wshouldincrease(thisisnotimmediate, however, sincethemonitoringisprivate).
Moreover, since players in ˆ w and ¯ w do not change their private states, we can eventually make
player i’s posterior probability that all the other players are in ¯ w as close to one as we like.
If di( ˆ w) 6= di( ¯ w), an application of Theorem 3 shows that the induced private proﬁle is not an
equilibrium.
The suppositions in the above logic can be weakened in two ways. First, it is not necessary
that the same private signal wi be more likely to have come from ˜ a than any other action proﬁle.
Itshouldbeenoughifforeachactionproﬁledifferentfrom ˜ a, thereisaprivatesignalmorelikely
to have come from ˜ a than that proﬁle, as long as the signal not mess up the other inferences
too badly. In that case, realizations of the other signals could undo any damage done without
negatively impacting on the overall inferences. For example, suppose there are two players,
with player 1 the player whose beliefs we are “manipulating,” and in addition to state ¯ w, player
2 could be in state ˆ w or w. Suppose also A2 = f˜ a2;a0
2;a00
2g. As before, suppose there is a signal
y such that w = s(w;y), ˆ w = s( ˆ w;y), and ¯ w = s( ¯ w;y), that is, any player in the state w, ˆ w,
or ¯ w, observing a private signal consistent with y stays in that private state. We would like the
odds ratio Pr(w2 6= ¯ wjht
1)=Pr(w2 = ¯ wjht
1) to converge to zero as t ! ¥, for appropriate private
histories. Let ˜ a1 = d1( ˆ w), ˜ a2 = d2( ¯ w), a0
2 = d2( ˆ w), and a00
2 = d2(w), and suppose there are two
private signals, w0
1 and w00











1j˜ a) > p1(w00
1j˜ a1;a00
2):
Then, after observing the private signal w0
1, we have
Pr(w2 = ˆ wjht
1;w0
1)









Pr(w2 = ˆ wjht
1)
Pr(w2 = ¯ wjht
1)
<
Pr(w2 = ˆ wjht
1)
Pr(w2 = ¯ wjht
1)
as desired, butPr(w2 =wjht
1;w0
1)=Pr(w2 = ¯ wjht
1;w0
1) increased. On the other hand, after observ-
inganotherprivatesignalw00





1) falls, Pr(w2 = ˆ wjht
1;w00
1)=Pr(w2 = ¯ wjht
1;w00
1) increases. However, it may be that the
increases can be offset by appropriate decreases, so that, for example, w0
1 followed by two re-
alizations of w00




1 result in Pr(w2 6= ¯ wjht
1)=Pr(w2 = ¯ wjht
1) being close to zero.
In terms of the odds ratios, the sequence of signals w0
1w00
1w00





























Our richness condition on private monitoring distributions captures this idea. For a private











denote the vector in ÂjA¡ij¡1 of the log odds ratios of the





1) > 0, where 0 is the 2£1 zero vector.17
Deﬁnition 7 A private-monitoring distribution (W;p) is rich, given signaling functions f, if
for all a 2 A and all y 2 Y, the convex hull of the set of vectors fga(wi) : wi 2 f¡1
i (y) and
pi(wijai;a0
¡i) > 0 for all a0
¡i 2 A¡ig has a nonempty intersection with Â
jA¡ij¡1
++ .
It will be useful to quantify the extent to which the conditions of Deﬁnition 7 are satisﬁed.
Since the space of signals and actions are ﬁnite, there are a ﬁnite number of constraints in
Deﬁnition 7, and so for any rich private monitoring distribution, the set of z over which the
supremum is taken in the next deﬁnition is non-empty.18
Deﬁnition 8 Given f, the richness of a rich private-monitoring distribution (W;p) is the supre-
mum of all z > 0 satisfying: for all y 2Y, the convex hull of the set of vectors fga(wi) : wi 2
f¡1
i (y) and pi(wijai;a0
¡i) ¸ z for all a0





++ : xk ¸ z for k = 1;:::;jA¡ij¡1g.
The second weakening concerns the nature of the strategy proﬁle. The logic assumed that
there is a signal y such that ˆ w = s( ˆ w;y) and ¯ w = s( ¯ w;y). If there were only two states, ˆ w and
¯ w, it would clearly be enough that there be a ﬁnite sequence of signals such that both ˆ w and
¯ w cycle. When there are more states, we also need to worry about what happens to the other
states. In addition, we need to allow for time-dependent proﬁles, and proﬁles that use some
states for only a ﬁnite time. Deﬁne R( ˜ w) as the set of states that are repeatedly reachable in the
same period as ˜ w (i.e., R( ˜ w) = fw 2W : fw; ˜ wg ½Wt inﬁnitely ofteng).
We generalize the cycling idea to the notion that there be a path that allows some dis-
tinguished state to be separated from every other state that could ever be reached. Given an
outcome path h ´ (y1;y2;:::) 2Y¥, let th ´ (yt;yt+1;:::) 2Y¥ denote the outcome path from
period t, so that h = (ht;th) and tht+t = (yt;yt+1;:::;yt+t¡1).
17The convex combination is strictly positive (rather than negative) because the deﬁnition of gaa0
¡i inverts the odds
ratios from the displayed equations.
18The bound z appears twice in the deﬁnition. Its ﬁrst appearance ensures that for all z > 0, there is uniform
upper bound on the number of private signals satisfying pi(wijai;a0
¡i) ¸ z in any private-monitoring distribution
with a richness of at least z.
20A B C
A 3;3 0;0 0;0
B 0;0 3;3 0;0
C 0;0 0;0 2;2
Figure 6: The normal form for Example 6.
Deﬁnition 9 The public strategy proﬁle is separating if there is some state ˜ w and an outcome
path h 2Y¥ such that there is another state w 2 R( ˜ w) that satisﬁes s(w;ht) 6= s( ˜ w;ht) for all
t, and for all t and w 2 R(s( ˜ w;ht)), if s(w;tht+t) 6= s( ˜ w;ht+t) for all t ¸ 0, then
di(s(w;tht+t)) 6= di(s( ˜ w;ht+t)) inﬁnitely often, for all i:
When the set of states is ﬁnite, our next Lemma (proved in the Appendix) shows that sepa-
ration is equivalent to a simpler and seemingly stronger cycling condition.
Lemma 6 A ﬁnite public strategy proﬁle of the public-monitoring game is separating if, and
only if, there is a ﬁnite sequence of signals ¯ y1;:::; ¯ ym, a collection of states Wc, and a state
¯ w 2Wc such that
1. s(w; ¯ y1;:::; ¯ ym) = w for all w 2Wc,
2. s(w; ¯ y1;:::; ¯ ym) 2Wc for all w 2 R( ¯ w),
3. 8w 2Wcnf ¯ wg, 8i 9k, 1 · k · m, such that
di(s(w; ¯ y1;:::; ¯ yk) 6= di(s( ¯ w; ¯ y1;:::; ¯ yk);
and
4. for some i and ˆ w 2Wcnf ¯ wg, di( ˆ w) 6= di( ¯ w).
Note that part 4 implies that jWcj ¸ 2. We emphasize that each state in the set of states Wc
cycles under the given ﬁnite sequence of signals and every state reachable (inﬁnitely often) in
the same period as ¯ w is taken intoWc by one round of the cycle.
Clearly, a separating proﬁle cannot have bounded recall. Moreover, it is easy to construct
PPE that neither have bounded recall nor are separating (Example 6). Nonetheless, we are














Figure 7: The strategy proﬁle for Example 6. In states wA and ˆ wA, the action A is played, while
in wB the action B and in wC, the actionC is played.
Example 6 The stage game is given in Figure 6. In the public-monitoring game, there are two
public signals, y0 and y00, with distribution (0 < q < p < 1)
r(y00ja1a2) =
½
p; if a1 = a2;
q; otherwise.
Finally, the public proﬁle is illustrated in Figure 7. This proﬁle is not separating: Under any
path in which y0y, y = y0 or y00, appears, all states transit to the same state. If only y00 appears,
only wA and ˆ wA arise. The deﬁnition of separation fails because play is the same at states wA
and ˆ wA.
The proﬁle is also not robust: After enough realizations of private signals corresponding to
y00, beliefs must assign roughly equal probability towA and ˆ wA,19 and so after the ﬁrst realization
of a private signal corresponding to y0, B is the only best reply (even if the current state is wC).
This example (like the second forgiving grim trigger of Example 3) illustrates the possibility
that beliefs over private states can drift to a stationary distribution when play is identical in
different states.
19This is most easily seen by considering the Markov chain describing player 2’s private state transitions con-
ditional on player 1 always playing A and always observing the same private signal consistent with y00 (a Markov
chain is associated with each w1 2 f1(y00)). Each such Markov chain is ergodic, and so has a unique stationary
distribution. A straightforward calculation shows that, in the limit (as the private-monitoring distributions become
arbitrarily close), the probability assigned to wA
2 equals 1
2.
22It remains to ensure that, under private monitoring, players may transit to different states. It
sufﬁces to assume the following, weaker than full-support, condition:20
Deﬁnition 10 A private monitoring distribution (W;p) that is e-close to a public monitoring
distribution (Y;r) has essentially full support if for all (y1;:::;yn) 2Yn,
pf(w1;:::;wn) 2 W : fi(wi) = yi; i = 1;:::;ng > 0:
Theorem 4 FixaseparatingstrictﬁnitePPEofafull-supportpublic-monitoringgame(˜ u¤;(Y;r)).
For all z > 0, there exists e0 > 0 such that for all e < e0, if (u;(W;p)) is a private-monitoring
game strongly e-close under some signalling function f to (˜ u¤;(Y;r)) with (W;p) having rich-
ness, given f, at least z and essentially full support, then the induced private proﬁle is not a
Nash equilibrium of the private monitoring game.
It is worth noting that the bound on e is only a function of the richness of the private
monitoring. It is independent of the probability that a disagreement in private states arises. By
considering ﬁnite state proﬁles that are separating, not only is the difﬁculty identiﬁed in the
Introduction dealt with (as we discuss at the end of the next Section), but we can accommodate
arbitrarily small probabilities of disagreement.
Thus, separating strict PPE of public-monitoring games are not robust to the introduction
of private monitoring.21 It, of course, also implies that separating behavior in the private-
monitoring game typically cannot coordinate continuation play in the following sense. Say
a proﬁle is e-strict if all the incentive constraints are satisﬁed by at least e. (The result follows
immediately from upperhemicontinuity and Theorem 4.)
Corollary 1 Fix a vector of signaling functions f, fi : Wi ! Y. Suppose f(uk;(W;pk))g is a
sequence of private-monitoring games, with (uk;(W;pk)) 1=k-close to some public-monitoring
game (˜ u¤;(Y;r)) and f(W;pk)g a rich sequence of distributions. Fix a pure strategy proﬁle
of the private monitoring game in which each player’s strategy respects his signaling function
fi (i.e., si(hi;ai;wi) = si(hi;ai; ˆ wi) if fi(wi) = fi( ˆ wi) 6= ?). Suppose this proﬁle is separating
(when interpreted as a public proﬁle). For all e > 0, there exists k0 such that for k > k0, this
proﬁle is not an e-strict Nash equilibrium.
Since the equilibrium failure of separating proﬁles seem to arise after private histories that
have low probability, an attractive conjecture is that equilibrium can be restored by appropri-
ately modifying the proﬁle at only the problematic histories. Unfortunately, such a modiﬁca-
tion appears to require additional modiﬁcations to the proﬁle, destroying the connection to the
public-monitoring game.
20If an essentially-full-support private monitoring distribution does not have full support, Nash equilibria of the
private-monitoring game may not have realization-equivalent sequentially-rational strategy proﬁles (recall Remark
2).
21The extension to mixed strategies described in footnote 16 also holds for Theorem 4.
236. The Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of Theorem 4 is by contradiction. So, suppose there exists z > 0 such that for
all k there exists a private monitoring game (u;(Wk;pk)) strongly 1=k-close under some f to
(˜ u¤;(Y;r)) with (Wk;pk) having richness at least z, with the induced private proﬁle a Nash
equilibrium of the private-monitoring game.
To develop intuition, suppose the space of signals for each player were independent of k, so
that Wk
i = Wi. Then, we can assume pk converges to a limit distribution p¥ on W (by choosing
a subsequence if necessary). The behavior of beliefs of player i over the private states of the
other players under the limit private monitoring distribution (W;p¥) is signiﬁcantly easier to
describe. Since (W;pk) is strongly 1=k-close to (Y;r) and pk ! p¥, for each y 2Y the event
f(w1;:::;wn) : wi 2 f¡1
i (y)g is common belief under p¥. Moreover, if the other players start
in the same state (such as ¯ w) then they stay in the same state thereafter. We can thus initially
focus on ﬁnding the appropriate sequence of signals to manipulate i’s updating about the current
private states of the other players, without being concerned about the possibility that subsequent
realizations will derail the process (we will deal with that issue subsequently). The difﬁculty,
of course, is that Wk
i depends on k, and moreover, that in principle as k gets large, so may Wk
i.












Since (Wk;pk) is strongly close to (Y;r), every signal in Wk
i is associated with some public
signal, and so we can partition W
k;ai
i into subsets of private signals associated with the same
public signal, W
k;ai
i (y). Order arbitrarily the signals in [aiW
k;ai
i (y), and give the `-th signal in






¯ ¯; note that ki;y is (crudely) bounded above by
jAij=z for all k. With this relabeling, and deﬁning Wi ´ [y2Y f(y;1);(y;2);:::;(y;ki;y)g, a ﬁnite














i \Wi 6= ?:
Without loss of generality, we can assume (2) holds with equality (simply include any signal
wi 2 WinWk
i in Wk
i, so that pk
i (wija) = 0).
We augment Wi, for each y 2 Y, by a new signal denoted w
y
i , and deﬁne W¥





. We interpret w
y
i as the set of i’s private signals associated with y that are not in
Wi. For each k, we can interpret W¥
i as a partition of Wk












: fi(wi) = y
o
may be empty). For each a 2 A, denote by
ˆ pk( ¢ ja) the probability distribution on ÕiW¥
i induced by pk( ¢ ja). Note that we now have a
24sequence of probability distributions fˆ pk(¢ja)gk for each a 2 A on a common ﬁnite signal space
ÕiW¥
i .




k is a convergent se-
quence with limit p¥(wja) for all a 2 A, w 2 ÕiW¥
i . Note that (W¥;p¥) is 0-close to (Y;r).
Moreover, by passing to a further subsequence if necessary, we can also assume that, for each
i, ai 2Ai, andy2Y, theconvexhullofthesetofvectorsfg¥
























In the following lemma, a private signal wj for player j is consistent with the private signal
wi for player i if fj(wj) = fi(wi), where fi and fj are the signaling functions from Deﬁnition
4. It is an implication of this lemma that if player i assigns strictly positive probability to all
the other players being in the state ¯ w, then after sufﬁcient repetitions of the cycle ~ wL
i (deﬁned
in Lemma 7), player i eventually assigns probability arbitrarily close to 1 that at the end of a
cycle, all the other players are in the state ¯ w.
Lemma 7 Fix a ﬁnite separating public proﬁle of the public-monitoring game, and let ¯ w, ˆ w,
Wc, and i be the states, set of states, and player identiﬁed in Lemma 6. Then, there exists a ﬁnite




i ), such that
1. si( ˆ w;~ wL
i ) = ˆ w,
2. forallsequencesofprivatesignals, ~ wL
j , forplayer j6=iconsistentwith~ wL
i , sj(w;~ wL
j )=w
for all w 2Wc, and
3. for all w 2Wn¡1




i jw¡i = w;wi = ˆ w)
Pr¥(~ wL
i jw¡i = ¯ w1;wi = ˆ w)
< 1; (3)
where Pr¥ denotes probabilities calculated under p¥ and the assumption that all players
follow the private proﬁle.
Proof. The cycle ¯ y1;:::; ¯ ym from Lemma 6 induces a cycle in the states ¯ w = ¯ w1;:::; ¯ wm+1 = ¯ w1








˜ a` ´ (ˆ a`
i; ¯ a`
¡i). Richness implies that for each `, there exists a vector of nonnegative integers,
(nwi)wi2f¡1
i (y`), so that for all a0
















25we have, for all a0















i (y`)nwi foreach`, denotebyN0 thelowestcommonmultipleoffn1;:::;nmg.
Let ~ wL
i denote the cycle of private signals for player i consistent with cycling N times through
the public signals ¯ y1; ¯ y2:::; ¯ ym and in which for each `, the private signal wi 2 f¡1
i (y`) appears
(N0=n`)nwi times. This cycle is of length L ´ mN0.
Given a private state proﬁle w 2Wn¡1
c , let ˇ a`






¡i = w;wi = ˆ w)
Pr¥(~ wL
i jwt


























For w 6= ¯ w1, then in each period at least one player is in a private state different from ¯ w. From
Lemma 6.2, ˇ a`
¡i 6= ˜ a`
¡i for at least one `, and so A(~ hL
i ;w) must be strictly less than 1.
Weare, ofcourse, primarilyconcernedwithprivatemonitoringunderthedistribution(Wk;pk).
In this situation, one must deal with the possibility that player j’s private signals may be incon-
sistent with player i’s observations. However, by choosing k sufﬁciently large, one can ensure
that this possibility does not arise with large probability along the cycle ~ wL
i . The subsequent
lemma implies that this possibility never arises with large probability.
Lemma 8 Assume the hypotheses of Lemma 7, and let ht
i be a private history for player i
satisfying ˆ w = si(ht
i). For all h > 0, there exists x > 0 and k0 (independent of ht
i) such that, for
all k > k0, if h < Prk(wt
¡i 2Wn¡1
c nf ¯ w1gjht
i) < 1 and Prk(wt
¡i = 2Wn¡1
c jht
i) < x, then
Prk(wt+L









¡i 6= ¯ w1jht
i)
Prk(wt
¡i = ¯ w1jht
i)
; (5)
where Prk denotes probabilities calculated under pk and the assumption that all players follow
the private proﬁle, and ~ wL
i is the sequence identiﬁed in Lemma 7.
Proof. For clarity, we suppress the conditioning on ht
i. Denote the event that players other than
i observe some sequence of private signals consistent with the cycle (¯ y1;:::; ¯ ym)N by~ y¡i, and
the complementary event by :~ y¡i. Then,
Prk(wt+L
¡i 6= ¯ w1; ~ wL
i ) = Prk(wt+L
¡i 6= ¯ w1; ~ wL
i ; ~ y¡i)+Prk(wt+L
¡i 6= ¯ w1; ~ wL
i ; :~ y¡i)
26and
Prk(wt+L
¡i 6= ¯ w1; ~ wL
i ; ~ y¡i)
· Prk(wt
¡i 6= ¯ w1; ~ wL
i ; ~ y¡i)
= Prk(wt
¡i 2Wn¡1
c nf ¯ w1g; ~ wL
i ; ~ y¡i)+Prk(wt
¡i = 2Wn¡1
c nf ¯ w1g; ~ wL
i ; ~ y¡i);
where the inequality arises because a player j 6= i may be in a private state not inWc. Now,
Prk(wt
¡i 2Wn¡1
c nf ¯ w1g; ~ wL
i ; ~ y¡i)
= Prk(~ wL
i ; ~ y¡ijwt
¡i 2Wn¡1
c nf ¯ w1g)Prk(wt
¡i 2Wn¡1
c nf ¯ w1g)
· Prk(~ wL
i ; ~ y¡ijwt
¡i 2Wn¡1
c nf ¯ w1g)Prk(wt
¡i 6= ¯ w1);
and if Prk(wt
¡i = 2Wn¡1
c nf ¯ w1g) < x (where x is to be determined),
Prk(wt
¡i = 2Wn¡1
c nf ¯ w1g; ~ wL
i ; ~ y¡i)+Prk(wt+L
¡i 6= ¯ w1; ~ wL
i ; :~ y¡i)
< x +Prk(wt+L
¡i 6= ¯ w1; ~ wL
i ; :~ y¡i)
· x +Prk(~ wL
i ; :~ y¡i)





¡i = ¯ w1; ~ wL
i ) ¸ Prk(wt
¡i = ¯ w1; ~ wL
i ; ~ y¡i)
= Prk(~ wL
i ; ~ y¡ijwt
¡i = ¯ w1)Prk(wt





¡i 6= ¯ w1)
¡







¡i 6= ¯ w1j~ wL
i )
Prk(wt+L




i ; ~ y¡ijwt
¡i 2Wn¡1
c nf ¯ w1g)+xt (k)
Prk(~ wL
i ; ~ y¡ijwt
¡i = ¯ w1)
£
Prk(wt
¡i 6= ¯ w1)
Prk(wt
¡i = ¯ w1)
·
maxw2Wn¡1
c nf ¯ w1gPrk(~ wL
i ; ~ y¡ijwt
¡i = w)+xt (k)
Prk(~ wL
i ; ~ y¡ijwt
¡i = ¯ w1)
£
Prk(wt
¡i 6= ¯ w1)
Prk(wt





c nf ¯ w1g
A(~ wL
i ;w) = max
w2Wn¡1




i ; ~ y¡ijwt
¡i = w)
Prk(~ wL
i ; ~ y¡ijwt
¡i = ¯ w1)
< 1;








i ; ~ y¡ijwt
¡i = w)+x0
Prk(~ wL
i ; ~ y¡ijwt
¡i = ¯ w1)
< 1¡x0:
The ﬁniteness of the state space and the number of players allows us to interchange the max and
lim operations. Consequently, there exists k00 such that for all k ¸ k00,
maxw2Wn¡1
c nf ¯ w1gPrk(~ wL
i ; ~ y¡ijwt
¡i = w)+x0
Prk(~ wL
i ; ~ y¡ijwt
¡i = ¯ w1)
< 1¡x0: (7)
Since (W;pk) is strongly 1=k-close to (Y;r), limk!¥Prk(:~ y¡ij~ wL
i ) = 0, and so there exists
k000 such that Prk(:~ y¡ij~ wL
i )<x0h=2 for all k ¸k000. Suppose x =x0h==2 and k0 =maxfk00;k000g.
Since h < Prk(wt
¡i 2 Wn¡1
c nf ¯ w1g) · Prk(wt
¡i 6= ¯ w1), xt(k) · x0. Consequently (7), with (6),
implies (5) (since x < x0).
Lemma 6 guarantees that one round of the cycle of signals will always take a state not inWc
intoWc, ensuring that the probability on states inWnWc can be controlled.
Lemma 9 Assume the hypotheses of Lemma 7, and let ht
i be a private history for player i
satisfying ˆ w = si(ht
i). Fix h > 0 and let x and k0 be the constants identiﬁed in Lemma 8 . There






Proof. Fix T large enough, so that if ¯ w 2Wt (the set of states reachable in period t) for t ¸ T,
thenWt ½ R( ¯ w) . Separation then implies Prk(wt+L
¡i = 2Wn¡1
c ; ~ y¡i) = 0; and so
Prk(wt+L
¡i = 2Wn¡1




c ; ~ y¡ij ~ wL
i )+Prk(wt+L
¡i = 2Wn¡1




c ; :~ y¡ij ~ wL
i )
· Prk(:~ y¡ij ~ wL
i );
which is less than x for k ¸ k0.
We are now in a position to complete the proof. Suppose ˆ ht
i is a private history for player
i that leads to the private state ˆ w with t ¸ T, and let h be the constant required by Theorem
3. Since ˆ w and ¯ w are both reachable in the same period, with positive probability player i
observes a private history ˆ ht
i that leads to the private state ˆ w. Moreover, at ˆ ht
i his posterior
beliefs that all the other players are in the private state ¯ w, Prk(wt
¡i = ¯ w1jˆ ht
i), is strictly positive
for all k, though converging to 0 as k ! ¥ (where Prk denotes probabilities under pk). If
28Prk(wt
¡i 6= ¯ w1jˆ ht
i) · h, then Prk(wt
¡i = ¯ w1jˆ ht
i) > 1¡h, and since di( ˆ w) 6= di( ¯ w), Theorem 3
yields the desired conclusion.
Suppose then that Prk(wt
¡i 6= ¯ w1jˆ ht
i) > h, and k > k0, where k0 is from Lemma 8. Lemmas
8 and 9 immediately imply that, as long as Prk(wt+kL
¡i 6= ¯ w1jht
i;(~ wL
i )k) > h, after the ﬁrst cycle,
the odds ratio falls until eventually, Prk(wt0
¡i 6= ¯ w1jht0
i ) · h, at which point we are in the ﬁrst
case (since ˆ w cycles under ~ wL
i , i’s private state continually returns to ˆ w).
We conclude by explaining how the difﬁculty identiﬁed in the Introduction is dealt with. In
the above argument, the length of the cycle was determined by Lemma 7 from the limit distribu-
tion (W¥;p¥), independently of Prk(wt
¡i = ¯ w1jˆ ht
i). Separation is critical here, since it allows us
to focus on a cycle, rather than an entire outcome path. We then considered private-monitoring
games sufﬁciently far out in the sequence, such that along the cycle, state transitions occur as
expected with high probability (Lemmas 8 and 9). Since we can use a cycle to manipulate
beliefs, the magnitude of the prior is irrelevant; all we need is that Prk(wt
¡i = ¯ w1jˆ ht
i) > 0.
A. Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose (u¤;(W;p)) is e-close to (˜ u¤;(Y;r)) with associated signaling

























































where the ﬁrst inequality follows from åyp(fw : fi(wi) = y for each igja) > 1¡ejYj (an im-
plication of part 1 of Deﬁnition 4), the second equality follows from j˜ u¤
i (y;ai)¡u¤
i (wi;ai)j < e
for all i 2 N, ai 2 Ai, and wi 2 f¡1
i (y), and the third inequality from part 1 of Deﬁnition 4 and
maxy;ai j˜ u¤
i (y;ai)j · maxwi;ai ju¤
i (wi;ai)j+e. The last term can clearly be made smaller than h
by appropriate choice of e.
29Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose there exists L such that for all w;w0 2 W reachable in the same
period and for all h 2Y¥,
s(w;hL) = s(w0;hL):
Then, for all w;w0 2W reachable in the same period and for all h 2Y¥,
d(s(w;ht)) = d(s(w0;ht)) 8t ¸ L+1:
If w = s(w1;y1;:::;yt¡L¡1) and w0 = s(w1; ˆ y1;:::; ˆ yt¡L¡1), then
s(ht) = d(s(w;yt¡L;:::;yt¡1))
= d(s(w0;yt¡L;:::;yt¡1))
= d(s(w0; ˆ yt¡L;:::; ˆ yt¡1)) = s(ˆ ht):
Suppose now the proﬁle s has bounded recall. Let (W;w1;s;d) be a representation of s.
Suppose w and w0 are two states reachable in the same period. Then there exists ht and ˆ ht such
that w = s(w1;ht) and w0 = s(w1;ˆ ht). Then, for all h 2Y¥, (ht;ht) and (ˆ ht;ht) agree for the
last t ¡1 periods, and so if t ¸ L+1, they agree for at least the last L periods, and so
d(s(w;ht)) = s(ht;ht)
= s(ˆ ht;ht) = d(s(w0;ht)):
Minimality of the representing automaton then implies that for all h 2Y¥ and w;w0 2W reach-
able in the same period, s(w;hL) = s(w0;hL).
Proof of Theorem 3. Let fi(w) be player i’s continuation value from the strategy proﬁle
(W;w;s;d) in the game with public monitoring (i.e., fi(w) is the continuation value of state




), and let fi(sijw) be the continuation value to player i from
following the strategy si when all the other players follow the strategy proﬁle (W;w;s;d). Since
the public proﬁle is a strict equilibrium andjWj<¥, there existsq >0 suchthat for alli, w2W,
and ˜ si, a deviation continuation strategy for player i with ˜ s1
i 6= di(w),
fi(˜ sijw) < fi(w)¡q:
Every strategy ˜ si in the game with public monitoring induces a strategy si in the games with
















from the private proﬁle induced by (W;w;s;d). Let Vp
i (sijht
i) denote player i’s continuation
value of a strategy si in the game with private monitoring, conditional on the private history ht
i.
30There exists e and h > 0 such that for all strategies ˜ si for player i in the game with public
monitoring, and all histories ht
i for i in the game with private monitoring, if the game with




i)¡fi(˜ sijw)j < q=3, where si is the induced strategy in the game with






i) > 1¡h. Denote by s0
i the private strategy described by (W;w;si;di), ˜ s0
i the public
strategy described by (W;w;s;di), si the private strategy described by (W;si(ht
i);si;di), and ˜ si















i is a proﬁtable deviation.
Proof of Lemma 6. It is immediate that if the proﬁle satisﬁes the conditions in the lemma, then
it is separating. Suppose, then, that the proﬁle is separating. Given the outcome path h 2 Y¥
and state ˜ w from the deﬁnition of separation, s(w;ht) denotes the state reached after the ﬁrst
t ¡1 signals in h from the state w.
The idea is to construct the set Wc by iteratively adding the states necessary to satisfy parts
1 and 2; parts 3 and 4 will then be implications of separation. We start by considering all states
reached inﬁnitely often from states in R( ˜ w) along h. While this implies a cycle of those states,
thereisnoguaranteethatotherstatesreachableinthesameperiodwillbemappedintothecycle.
Accordingly, we include states that are reached inﬁnitely often from states that are reachable
under any history in the same period as the states just identiﬁed, and so on. Proceeding in this
way, we will construct a set of states and a ﬁnite sequence of signals with the properties that
the states cycle under the sequence, and every state that could arise is mapped under the ﬁnite
sequence of signals to a cycling state.
We begin by denoting by w1(t) the vector of states (s(w;ht))w2R( ˜ w) 2 WR( ˜ w). Since W is
ﬁnite, so is WR( ˜ w), and there exists T1
1 such that for all t ¸ T1
1 , w1(t) appears inﬁnitely often
in the sequence fw1(t)gt. LetW1 ´
n
s(w;hT1
1 ) : w 2 R( ˜ w)
o
, i.e.,W1 is the collection of states
that can be reached in period T1
1 under h, starting from any state in R( ˜ w). Separation implies ¯
¯W1¯
¯ ¸ 2. By the deﬁnition of T1




as k ! ¥, satisfying, for all k ¸ 2,
w1(Tk
1 ) = w1(T1
1 );
31and for all t ¸ T1
1 and k ¸ 1, there exists a period t with Tk
1 < t · Tk+1
1 such that
w1(t) = w1(t):
The ﬁrst displayed equation implies that for all w 2W1, s(w;T1
1hTk
1 ) = w for all k. The second
implies that for any state w in R( ˜ w) and any t ¸ T1
1 , the state w0 = s(w;ht) appears at least once
between each pair of dates Tk
1 and Tk+1
1 , for all k. For t ¸ T1
1 , w1(t) has
¯ ¯W1¯ ¯ distinct states,














for t ¸ T1








and for all t ¸ T1
k and k ¸ 1, there exists a period t with Tk
k < t · Tk+1
k such that
wk(t) = wk(t):






2WR(Wk). There exists ˆ t ¸ 1 such that for all t ¸ ˆ t, wk+1(t) appears
inﬁnitely often in the sequence fwk+1(t)gt. Moreover, there exists T1
k+1 ¸ T1
k +ˆ t such that
s(w;T1
khT1
k+1) = w 8w 2Wk:
Now, deﬁne Wk+1 = fs(w;T1
khT1
k+1) : w 2 R(Wk)g. By the deﬁnition of T1
k+1, Wk ½ Wk+1.
Just as in the initial step, there is an increasing sequence fTk
k+1g¥
k=2, with Tk
k+1 ! ¥ as k ! ¥,




and for all t ¸ T1
k+1 and k ¸ 1, there exists a period t with Tk
k+1 < t · Tk+1
k+1 such that
wk+1(t) = wk+1(t);
concluding the recursive step.
Since W is ﬁnite, this process must eventually reach a point where Wk+1 =Wk. We have
thus identiﬁed a set of statesWk and two dates T1
k and T2
k , such that letting (¯ y1;:::; ¯ ym) ´T1
k hT2
k
and setting ¯ w = s( ˜ w;hT1
k ) yields parts 1 and 2 of the Lemma.
Separation implies that under h, for any state w 2 R( ˜ w)nf ˜ wg and for all players i, there is
some state reached inﬁnitely often from w under h at which i plays differently from the state
reached in that period from ˜ w. The dates T1
k and T2
k have been chosen so that any state reached
32inﬁnitely often under h from a state w 2 R( ˜ w) appears at least once between T1
k and T2
k on the
path starting in period T1
k from the state s(w;hT1
k ). Consequently, we have part 3.
Finally, since
¯ ¯W1¯ ¯ ¸ 2, jWcj ¸ 2. If part 4 does not hold for the current choice of cycle
and states, by part 3, it will hold in some period of the cycle (¯ y1;:::; ¯ ym), say period `. Part 4
then holds as well for the cycle beginning in period `, (¯ y`;:::; ¯ ym; ¯ y1;:::; ¯ y`¡1), the state ¯ w =
s( ˜ w;hT1
k ; ¯ y1;:::; ¯ y`¡1), and the set of cycling states is given by fs(w; ¯ y1;:::; ¯ y`¡1) : w 2Wcg.
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